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REEXAMINING THE ARGUMENTS IN OWEN M.
FISS, AGAINST SETTLEMENT
Kenneth R. Feinberg*
You may think that I have been added to this panel to cause trouble.
Owen is Jimmy Stewart in Destry Rides Again1 and I'm Brian Donlevy, and
I'm here to cause trouble. 2 That's not true. My goal is to get Owen to go
back to Yale and write a sequel to this seminal article.3 And I'm not sure
what the sequel should be. It might be Still Against Settlement. It might be,
by the end of the day, Against Settlement Sometimes. Or it might be, just
like The Godfather I and II, Against Settlement I. That's up to Owen as
author.
But I think he should update what has proven to be one of the handful of
law review articles that have truly been precedent setting. There is the
article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren about privacy, 4 and Hans
Zeisel's works, those fabulous University of Chicago Law Review articles
about how juries behave. 5 We all have our favorites.
Against Settlement is one of those articles that is critically important for
everybody to read because of what it says and how it says it.
But I think, as a practical matter, twenty-five years later, the best way to
look at Owen's article is as an article that is aspirational. It's a benchmark,
food for thought. How close can we get to the benchmark?
What we have learned in the last twenty-five years since that article was
written is that Owen's thesis, and the way he develops that article, have run
up against two hard, practical realities that undercut his aspirational
objective.
* Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, U.S. Department of the Treasury;
Managing Partner and Founder, Feinberg Rozen LLP; Special Master of the September 11 th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; Special Master/Referee, New York City Homeless
Litigation. I delivered these remarks on April 3, 2009, at Fordham University School of Law
as part of the symposium Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later. These remarks
have been lightly edited and footnotes have been added.
1. DESTRY RIDEs AGAIN (Universal Pictures 1939).
2. Id.
3. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).

4. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
5. Hans Zeisel ....

And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,

38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1971) (scrutinizing the reduction of twelve-member juries to six
members); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on
the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1974) (critically examining empirical evidence
on six-member and twelve-member juries).
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The first challenge is the inefficiency of the civil justice system. If you
are against settlement in any realistic way, however you define it, what is
the alternative? Few can agree with Owen in terms of the practical, day-today running of the civil justice system. The articles you read today are
about the vanishing trial, not against settlement. No one wants to go to
trial. The consumers of the civil justice system do not like the costs, the
inefficiencies, the uncertainties, the frustrations, or the delays. That's one
practical problem that undercuts the aspirational objective.
The second problem exposed in the last twenty-five years is the political
inertia of the other branches of government. Effectively, if you are against
settlement-well, what are you standing for? If you think Congress or state
legislatures or the executive branch are going to promote the normative
values that are otherwise sought in the civil justice system, you must be
living on a different planet. On the part of the other branches of
government, there is no realistic, day-to-day willingness to step in and ratify
those norms sought by Owen. Whatever Judge Jack Weinstein 6 did in
Agent Orange,7 it was done because of an abdication on the part of other
branches to step in and implement or ratify some of Owen's norms. 8 When
you try to deal with the implications of Owen's piece, do not underestimate
the challenges posed by inefficiency and political inertia, because they lead
in the direction of settlement by default. You can't look at this problem in a
vacuum and say, "We've got to be careful." Yes, we have to be careful in
settlement, but what's the alternative?
Here's another way of looking at it. When I went to law school, at the
time of Owen's article, who were the judges that were looked upon as the
"first team"? Back in 1984, Judge Weinstein, Judge Edward Weinfeld, 9
and Judge Edward Gignoux in Maine l0 were the leading scholars. On the
state bench it was Chief Judge Stanley Fuld 1 1 here in New York and Judge
Roger Traynor 12 in California who were the scholars, the Cardozo types,
who thought about how the law should develop and how the substantive
and procedural law should be articulated.
It is different today. Today it's not Weinstein the scholar, it's Weinstein
the case manager; it's Judge Charles Breyer in San Francisco, 13 to whom
the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Panel looks for prompt, efficient
6. Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York.
7. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
8. See Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 1265, 1268-69 (2009).
9. Hon. Edward Weinfeld, Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.
10. Hon. Edward Gignoux, Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Maine.
11. Hon. Stanley Fuld, Chief Judge, State of New York Court of Appeals.
12. Hon. Roger Traynor, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
13. Hon. Charles Breyer, Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.
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litigation. It is Judge Eldon Fallon in Louisiana who has the Vioxx cases 14
that must be settled.
Today, let's make sure that the civil justice system is made more
efficient, that the trains run on time, and that it is recognized that justice
delayed is justice denied. If you are going to write an article about Against
Settlement, by any reasonable definition, you had better consider the
implications: What are we going to do with these cases in the absence of
efficiency and in the absence of political will on the part of the other
branches of government? What's the reality of the situation?
So what do we see? We see an attempt to deal with alternatives. Now,
in the mass tort context, I think that the objectives advanced in Owen's
article have already been met. What's the purpose of trying an asbestos
case 15 or a tobacco case 1 6 or a Zyprexa 17 case? What's sought to be
achieved? These are "mature torts," with little left to be decided.
The article that you should read next to Owen's article is one by Francis
McGovern in the Boston University Law Review on the maturation of
litigation. 18 And others have written about this. There comes a time when
we already know so much about the litigation-when we already know how
mature the litigation is, the value sought to be achieved, the normative
scope of the litigation-that it really doesn't make any sense to go forward
and try the cases.
In most mature mass torts there must be an asterisk and footnote in
Owen's piece saying, "My aspirational objectives have already been
achieved in this litigation and, in the absence of Congress intervening, a
settlement is fine." We already know what's transparent. We already know
enough about that type of litigation that any desire to vindicate norms and
values probably is unnecessary. It has been done over and over again.
Most mass torts-not all, but most-constitute a "mass" because honey
attracts lawyers who see the likelihood of success based on vindication of
certain values. In those cases, you don't have to confront any more of
Owen's objectives.
Now, in the broader structural litigation, which is really what Owen was
focusing on-the Coney Island desegregation cases, 19 the homeless
cases 20-the issue in those cases is not jury deliberation of liability and
14. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. La. 2006).
15. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1996).
16. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated,407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.
2005).
17. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
18. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659
(1989).
19. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21 (Coney Island), 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).

20. See McCain v. Dinkins, 639 N.E.2d 1132, 1132 (N.Y. 1994) (upholding trial court's
finding of civil contempt resulting from city's violation of court order requiring it to cease
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damage. The first issue in those cases is, in the absence of political will on
the part of the other branches of government, whether the judiciary would
be willing to monitor, oversee, and bring transparency and sunlight in order
to achieve an effective resolution of such structural litigation. We start with
the premise that the judiciary, the third branch, by default is required to
enter the fray.
Second, the question then becomes not the necessity of a bench trial or a
jury finding of liability but, rather, the willingness of the judge to read
Owen's article and make sure that, with transparency, outreach, notice, and
opportunity to be heard, the values sought to be promoted in Owen's article
are achieved.
One thing I have learned in the last twenty-five years in settling cases is
that, ironically, most judges want no part of being directly involved in
settlement discussions. Think about the irony. The article is entitled
Against Settlement. Most federal judges that I deal with endorse that
phrase, at least as it impacts them directly. They have no interest in getting
directly involved in any settlement process. Philosophically, they find that
they have an aversion to direct involvement in settlement. Most tral judges
that I deal with welcome settlement: "We're all for it, but don't ask us to
play any significant role whatsoever."
Now, the reason that judicial aversion to being involved in settlements
becomes very important is that if in structural reform you are looking for
proactive judges to vindicate Owen's values by promoting transparency,
sunlight, outreach, notice, and opportunity to be heard, then you can put the
number of federal judges on two hands.
Instead, what I find are judges who will say, "Go for it. Great. Don't ask
me. I'll do what I have to do under the rigorous training that I've received
at the Federal Judicial Center. I don't oversee. I don't want to monitor. I
try cases. I'm the umpire. I have a role to play. So go ahead, Ken, be very
creative, but I'll call you, don't call me."
Now, that's a problem. The other branches won't enter the fray on
structural reform. The trial judge, by default, has to do it.
But then you start discussing how to monitor Coney Island,2 1 or

housing homeless families at welfare office emergency assistance units, but holding as
improper trial court's order that city officials spend night in emergency assistance unit); see
also Leslie Kaufman, One Constant in Homeless Litigation: New York v. the Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at B1.
21. 383 F. Supp. 769.
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prisons, 2 2 or the homeless in Manhattan 23-Justice Helen Freedman 24 was
criticized for the way she tried to monitor day-to-day, homeless family
disposition in Manhattan. I was her Special Master. She was criticized by
politicians, private litigants, and the Legal Aid Society. 25 It was a no-win
for her. And yet, she realized that in order to vindicate some of the values
that Owen discussed in his piece, she had to withstand the criticism, and she
has been vindicated by the New York State Court of Appeals. But it is very
difficult.
So those problems come up because of inefficiency and political inertia.
A judge steps in-if you can find a judge willing to vindicate those rights.
And, then, you run into this problem, which Susan Sturm talks about, of
reflecting normative values. 26 I don't know about that. If you can find a
trial judge willing to vindicate those normative values, chances are that you
are going to have a trial judge who is going to vindicate his or her own
personal normative values.
I remember in Agent Orange how the court, the Special Master, and the
consultants all worked together. But, every once in a while you would
pause when one of the lawyers would say, "What are you doing? You're
making it up as you go along." Well, the Second Circuit approved the
settlement. 2 7 In effect the court said, "We approve the settlement, affirmed.
However, don't come back again with one of these."
So I wonder if there is a better way. Well, maybe Owen will write an
article that will be entitled Settlement: A Better Way. But I don't know
what's a better way. The system is so inefficient that the consumers of the
system don't want to use it-that's clear. And when they use it, they want
to use it just as long as it will serve as leverage to get a result. That result
need not be a bench trial or a jury finding.
When you turn and say to the Congress, "Do something about
asbestos" 28-"No"; "Well, do something about DES" 29 -"No"; "Well, do

22. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the
overcrowding at Riker's Island is unconstitutional and ordering further reductions in prison
population); see also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming that retroactive application of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act to terminate consent decrees governing conditions in New
York City jails is not unconstitutional, but reversing to the extent that the consent decrees
were vacated, and holding that federal courts no longer have jurisdiction to enforce such
decrees and detainees may seek relief from state courts).
23. See Kaufman, supra note 20.
24. Hon. Helen E. Freedman, Justice, New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department.
25. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 20.
26. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J.
Disp. RESOL. 1, 51-60.
27. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
28. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1 (E. & S.D.N.Y 1996).
29. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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something about prisons" 3 0 -"No"; "Well, do something about Coney
lsland,'3 1--"No"; "Well, do something about... "-"No, no, no." I don't
know what else you do. But you hope that the civil justice system and the
judiciary will step in and vindicate the laws and values of the parties. How?
Proactively.
Judge Weinstein went around the country in Agent Orange, before the
Internet, and held hearings around the country. 32 "Come on in, consumers,
Vietnam veterans, come on in. Tell me about it. Tell me, what do you
want me to do?" Hearing after hearing. Pervasive notice. And he
galvanized the Vietnam organizations, the soldier organizationsgalvanized them, but not necessarily to be supportive. I'm not sure he cared
whether they were supportive or not, as long as they were active, which was
more important than being supportive. They had a stake in the venture at
least.
I suspect in 2009 the best recipe for vindicating what Owen really wants
vindicated is the trial judge who will be proactive, monitor, demand, reach
out, and give all those interested an opportunity to be heard. That's the best
you can do today, I think. There are very few federal judges who want to
do that-very few federal or state judges.
You can see now why I'm not Brian Donlevy. 33 I think what Owen
wrote is aspirational. It is food for thought. It requires everybody to think.
But I'm not sure, twenty-five years later, we have a better way other than
the proactive trial judge who is going to try single-handedly to vindicate
Owen's theses.
Thank you.

30. See supra note 22.
31. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21 (Coney Island), 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
32. See Symposium, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Tort Litigation, and the Public Good: A
Roundtable Discussion To Honor One of America's Great Trial Judges on the Occasion of

His 80th Birthday, 12 J.L. &POL'Y 149, 174-75 (2003).
33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

